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THE RULE THATA SPOUSE CANNOT FORFEIT
AT DIVORCE WHAT HE OR SHE HAS
CONTRIBUTED TO THE MARRIAGE:
AN ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE
ELSJE BONTHUYS*
Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Section 9 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 allows for an order that one of the spouses may
forfeit some or all of the financial benefits of the marriage at the time of divorce. South
African courts have interpreted this remedy so as to limit forfeiture to the spouse who
contributed least to the joint estate or whose separate estate shows the smaller accrual,
while the spouse who had made the larger financial contribution to the marriage is
protected from forfeiture. This article provides three sets of arguments questioning this
interpretation. First, it shows the existence of Roman and Roman-Dutch authorities to
the effect that a spouse could forfeit assets which he or she had contributed to the marriage.
It also highlights early South African case law holding that both financial and
non-financial contributions should be taken into account when making aforteiture order at
divorce. The article also analyses case law to illustrate how the courts' treatment of marital
misconduct and contribution operate to favour the kinds of behaviour typically engaged in
by men, while devaluing the behaviour of typical wives. This may amount to
discrimination on the basis of gender and may therefore be vulnerable to constitutional
challenge. The article concludes by looking forward to a long overdue overhaul of South
African family law legislation, specifically the Divorce Act. It examines the role which a
general redistributive discretion should play in ameliorating the consequences of the chosen
matrimonial property regime at the end of marriage, but cautions that, in sexist societies,
judicial discretions are often exercised in ways which benefit men at the expense of women.
I INTRODUCTION
Unlike other systems of family law, South African law allows parties to
choose their matrimonial property system by way of antenuptial contract.
Although the financial consequences of the dissolution of marriage follow
broadly from the chosen matrimonial property system, certain statutory and
common-law mechanisms allow for a variation from the rigours of the
applicable property regime. This article concerns one of these mechanisms,
namely forfeiture of benefits in terms of s 9 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.
The focus is upon the scope and interpretation of this remedy, particularly
the narrow interpretation of the Divorce Act, which limits forfeiture orders
to the spouse who contributed least to the joint estate or whose separate
estate shows the smaller accrual. Conversely, the spouse who had made the
larger financial contribution to the marriage is protected from forfeiture
orders. My goal is to provide arguments upon which an alternative
interpretation of the Act could be based, which allows for either spouse to
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forfeit economic benefits at divorce. The reasons for my dissatisfaction with
the current rule are also reflected by Heaton in her 2005 article, which argues
that:
'a forfeiture order often is rather an empty remedy. Forfeiture does not entail
that a spouse loses his or her own assets. It merely entails that he or she loses his
or her claim to the matrimonial property the other spouse contributed ... In
essence, therefore, a forfeiture order is effective only if it is made against the
poorer spouse .... It is arguable that restricting the scope of forfeiture to a
spouse's claim to share in the matrimonial property the other spouse contrib-
uted amounts to indirect gender discrimination. Wives generally own and
acquire fewer assets and therefore contribute less matrimonial property than
husbands do. '
Section 9(1) of the Divorce Act provides that a court may 'order that the
patrimonial benefits of the marriage be forfeited... if the court. . is satisfied
that, if the order for forfeiture is not made, the one party will in relation to
the other be unduly benefitted'. The Divorce Act therefore contains no
explicit indication that a forfeiture order may only be made against the spouse
who contributed least to the joint estate or whose accrual is smallest. Instead,
this particular application of the forfeiture rule proceeds from the common-
law view that the patrimonial benefits of a marriage in community of
property or a marriage subject to the accrual system are to be found in the
right to share in financial wealth which was generated by the other spouse.
Accordingly, the spouse who contributes most to the joint estate or the
combined accrual gains no patrimonial benefits from the marriage and
cannot therefore be subject to a forfeiture order. This reasoning is explained
by Sonnekus as follows:
'Forfeiture of benefits at divorce arises in matrimonial property law because in
all forms of marriage, excepting those which exclude all forms of financial
sharing, it is possible that one spouse may at divorce gain financial benefits
which were in fact contributed by the other spouse. Because marriage
inevitably creates the possibility that one spouse may make a larger contribution
than the other, forfeiture of benefits is ordered in those exceptional circum-
stances where ... a divorce court must intervene to prevent undue benefit
being afforded to one spouse. Marriage and its patrimonial consequences
therefore never guarantee the chance of financial gain to one party only, as
would a raffle at a funfair.'
2
'Jacqueline Heaton 'Striving for substantive gender equality in family law:
Selected issues' (2005) 21 SAJHR 547 at 557-8.2J C Sonnekus 'Verbeurdverklaring van voordele: Welke voordele? JW v SW
2011 (1) SA 545 (GNP)' 2011 TSAR 787. The text contains my own translation of
the original Afrikaans, which reads: 'Verbeurdverklaring van voordele binne die
huweliksvermo~nsreg kom by egskeiding, op uitsondering van huweike met koue
uitsluiting, ter sprake ten aansien van elke huweliksvermo~nsregtehke bedeling want
by elke ander huweiksvermonsregtelike bedeling bestaan die moontlikheid dat die
een party danksy die huweliksbedeling by be6indiging van die huwehk voordele mag
geniet wat in der waarheid deur die ander party bygedra is. Trouens, juis omdat
huwehksluiting met uitsondering van koue uitsluiting onder elke ander vermoen-
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The remainder of this article consists of three substantive parts. The first of
these traces the legal development of forfeiture of benefits from Roman and
Roman-Dutch law to pre-Divorce Act South African law. I show how the
statements of the old authorities to the effect that a spouse can forfeit assets
which he or she had contributed to the marriage were gradually, and by way
of questionable arguments, transformed into a consensus that forfeiture
cannot be ordered against the spouse who had made the larger financial
contribution to the marriage. I also highlight early South African case law,
now seemingly forgotten, to the effect that both financial and non-financial
contributions should be taken into account when making a forfeiture order
at divorce.
In the second part of the article, I deal specifically with the courts'
application of forfeiture of benefits in terms of s 9 of the Divorce Act. I argue
that the case law illustrates three competing, and often contradictory,
principles which undergird forfeiture of benefits, namely punishment of
marital misconduct, financial contribution to the marital estate, and pacta
sunt servanda. I further show how the courts' treatment of marital miscon-
duct and contribution consistently operates to favour the kinds of behaviour
typically engaged in by men, while devaluing the behaviour of typical wives.
In the third part, I attempt to show that the current interpretation of the
forfeiture rule is neither inevitable, nor legally sound. In order to do this, I
first examine the extent to which pre-1979 authorities and arguments should
apply to the contemporary legal and social situation, and then proceed to the
definitional questions of what constitutes the patrimonial benefits of mar-
riage and what is meant by a contribution to the financial benefits of
marriage. I briefly compare the legal phenomena of forfeiture of patrimonial
benefits upon divorce, on the one hand, and the application of the 'bloedige
hand' rule when the marriage is dissolved by death, on the other hand.
Finally, I analyse the effect of the constitutional prohibition of gender
discrimination on the way in which courts have interpreted forfeiture of
benefits. The article concludes by looking forward to a long overdue
overhaul of South African family law legislation, specifically the Divorce Act.
It examines the role which a general redistributive discretion should play in
ameliorating the consequences of the chosen matrimonial property regime at
the end of marriage, but cautions that, in sexist societies, judicial discretions
are often exercised in ways which benefit men at the expense of women.
sregtelike bedeling di element van 'n kanskontrak het dat een party meer as die ander
mag bydra, word vir verbeurdverklaring voorsiening gemaak in daardie uitsonderlike
omstandighede waar... die bevoordeling van die nie-bydraer as dermate onbehoor-
lik geag word dat die egskeidingshof behoort in te gryp. Huweliksluiting en die
gepaardgaande vermoensregtefike gevolge daarvan is dus nooit 'n gewaarborgde
wenkaartjie vir net een party soos by 'n kermis se tombolatafel nie.'
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II HISTORICAL BASIS FOR FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS
(a) Roman law
The concept of financial penalties at divorce for unacceptable marital
conduct predates the Divorce Act. Its origins have been traced back to
Roman law where, except for marriages subject to manus mariti, 3 spouses
generally retained their own assets and liabilities for the duration of the
marriage, akin to modem marriages out of community of property.4
Upon marriage, women would usually be provided by their families with a
dowry, or dos, as their contribution to household expenses during marriage.
According toJolowitz & Nicholas, it was also possible for a woman who was
sui iuris to provide her own dos from property which belonged to her.'
Although the dos would legally become the property of the husband for the
duration of marriage, his rights to manage and dispose of this property were
soon restricted by various mechanisms. The provider of the dos could
stipulate, by way of the cautio rei uxoriae, that the dos should be returned at
the end of the marriage. In Republican times, the praetorian action (actio rei
uxoriae) extended the right to reclaim the dos at the end of marriage also to
cases where no such stipulation had been made. A husband faced with a claim
for the return of the dos at divorce could retain certain portions thereof in
favour of the children of the marriage and, significant for this article, could
retain one-eighth of the dos for minor misconduct of the wife during
marriage and one-sixth for major misconduct, using the retentio propter
mores uxoris. 6 In this way a wife could forfeit certain marital property
provided either by her or on her behalf as a result of marital misconduct.
Conversely, the husband could also suffer financial penalties for misconduct
at divorce. According to Corbett, '[b]y proving his adultery, the divorced
woman could exact immediate repayment of that part of the dowry which
under ordinary circumstances was recoverably only in instalments, and
additional fruits or revenues for the rest'. 7
During and after the classical period, husbands often made marriage
settlements in favour of their wives (donatio propter nuptias) in order to
3 In marriages cum manu the wife was subject to her husband's potestas and could
therefore not own any property, but by the classical period (from the time ofAugustus
to Diocletian) these kinds of marriages were mostly replaced by so-called 'free mar-
riages'. On the establishment, effects and prevalence of manus mariti generally, see
Percy Elwood Corbett The Roman Law of Marriage (1930) 107-18; Fritz Schultz
Classical Roman Law (1951) 115-21.
' HJ Erasmus, C G van der Merwe & A H van Wyk Lee and Honor6 Family, Things
and Succession 2 ed (1983) para 13; H R, Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and
Wife 5 ed (1985) 373; Schultz op cit note 3 at 118; D J Joubert 'Verbeuring van
voordele van huwelik na egskeiding' (1982) 15 Dejure 217 at 218-19.
' H FJolowitz & Barry Nicholas Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 3
ed (1972) 236; Schultz op cit note 3 at 123.
6 Schultz op cit note 3 at 126-8; Corbett op cit note 3 at 182-4 and 192-3.
7 Op cit note 3 at 133.
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increase the money available to support their widows." Although there seems
to be some uncertainty about the exact nature of this donation, it is clear that
the Christian Roman emperors enacted legislation, reflected in the Corpus
Iuris Civilis, to punish spouses who divorced without sufficient reason or who
committed adultery, by providing for penalties payable from both the dos
and the donatio propter nuptias. 9 These punishments were imposed on
husbands and wives alike and husbands could, therefore, forfeit assets which
they had contributed to the marriage.
I should emphasise that this does not mean either that the punishments for
marital misconduct of men and women were the same or that similar norms
of marital behaviour applied to husbands and wives. These financial penalties
for misconduct co-existed with deeply sexist views of appropriate marital
conduct' ° and, at least before the lexJulia de Aldulteriis, with the husband's
right to kill a wife whom he discovered in the act of adultery.I' My argument
is simply that, in terms of Roman law, a wife could forfeit assets brought into
the marriage either by her on her behalf, and that the same was true for the
husband.
(b) Roman-Dutch law
The Roman rules relating to marriage and divorce were not replicated in
Roman-Dutch law,' 2 which was based on a completely different system. In
this system a wife did not usually contribute a dowry to the marriage, and
unless an antenuptial contract stipulated the contrary, all pre-marital and
subsequently acquired assets and liabilities fell into ajoint estate administered
by the husband in terms of his marital power.13 Nevertheless, forfeiture of
benefits remained a possibility at divorce.
Significant for the purpose of my argument is Voet's statement to the
following effect:
'Innocent spouse can claim dowry or donatio propter nuptias and one-third of other
goods, with some exceptions. -
Moreover that a sundering of the marriage can be claimed on account of
adultery by the innocent spouse has been fully stated in our title on Divorce. And
that a dowry or donation on accomt of marriage is taken away from the guilty
spouse, and passes to the innocent spouse along with the amount of the third
part of the dowry out of the remaining goods, unless there are children in
existence, as also in some few other excepted cases has been explained in our
title on The Claim for Dowry on Dissolution on Marriage.
8 Schultz op cit note 3 at 120.
9 Sheldon Amos History and Principles of the Civil Law of Rome (1989) 286; Corbett
op cit note 3 at 205-10.
t0 For instance, see Corbett op cit note 3 at 219, 244.
" See Corbett op cit note 3 at 135; Jolowitz & Nicholas op cit note 5 at 118.
12 Schultz op cit note 3 at 104-5.
, R W Lee An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law 5 ed (1953) 67; Hahlo op cit note
4 at 13; D S P Cronj6 & Jacqueline Heaton South African Family Law 2 ed (2004)
69-70.
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This law holds good in Holland by custom -
This also holds good by the customs of today, since it was ordained by the States
of Holland that the penalties above described must be inflicted, without
prejudice to the innocent spouse of his or her own rights which are available to
him or to her in accord with the written law.'14
Lybrechts 5 and Kersteman 16 support the argument that a person could, in
Roman-Dutch law, be ordered to forfeit financial assets which he or she had
brought into the marriage by citing a 1545 decision of the Court of Holland
holding '[t]hat an adulterous man forfeit in favour of his wife all assets which
he had contributed'.
17
In the matter decided in 1515 between Klemente Klaas and Dirk Hein
Thou, the Court of Holland held that the adulterous husband
'forfeited all the assets that he had brought into the marriage and ordered that
the defendant husband hand over all these goods to the plaintiff together with
any fruits which he had received ... and to return to the plaintiff all the assets
which she had brought into the marriage together with their fruits'. 8
This provides clear evidence of cases in Roman-Dutch law which ordered a
guilty party to forfeit assets which he or she had contributed. These decisions
to deprive the adulterous spouse of his or her own assets would resonate with
the punitive approach to adultery in Roman-Dutch law. The Political
Ordinance of 1 April 158019 explicitly acknowledged the religious condem-
nation of adultery20 which justified the list of financial and other punish-
ments meted out to different categories of adulterers and concluded:
'Ended dat al onvermindert alsulken recht als de geoffenseerde parthye, 'tzy
Man ofte Vrouwe, jegens den Overspeelder competeert, soo tot scheydinghe
van den Houwelijke, als andersints near recthen, soo ook by desen verstaen
worden in vigeur te blyven alle de straten ende poenen in de Keyserlike ende
beschreven Rechten gestatueert, tegens alle crimen van ontschaeken, ontvo-
eren end bloedschenden, ende diergelijke gequalificeerde hoerereyen.'2 1
"4 Voet 48.5.11, Gane's translation, footnotes omitted. Voet is supported by various
authorities, but there are several authorities to the contrary. For a more complete
overview of the authorities, see Celliers v Celliers 1904 TS 926 at 926-7; Higgins v
Higgins (1885-7) 5 ECD 344 at 344-5.
15 Red Vertoog 1.12.5 at 168.
16 Woordenboeks v 'dissolutie'at 105-6.
17 Lybrechts Red Vertoog 1.12.5 at 168: (my translation of'dat een Man, die staande
Huwlyk, Overspel hadde gecommitteerd, ten behoeve van zyne Huisvrou, alle zyne
ten Huwlyk aangebraghte goederen hadde verbeurd'.)
18 Sententien van de Hooge Raad cas 8 (1515) 25 at 26: (my translation of'verbeurd te
hebben alle de goederen die hij aan de voorst impetrante ten Huwelijk gebracht heft,
en condemneerd die voorst gedaagte die voorst goederen d'impetrante te laten vol-
gen, met de vruchten die hij daar van ontfangen heeft ... die impetrante te restitu-
eren, all de goeden die zij aan den gedaagde ten Huwelijk gebracht heeft met de
vructhen van dien gevallen...').
19 Groot Placaat Boek vol 3 504 arts 14-17 setting out the punishments.
20 Art 14.
2 Art 18, meaning that the penalties in the Political Ordinance of 1580 co-existed
with the rights the innocent party had at divorce.
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Indeed, a rule that a guilty party would only forfeit financial benefits to the
other spouse if he or she had made a smaller financial contribution to the
marriage would be diametrically opposed to the criminalisation of adultery
and the severe penalties instituted by the Political Ordinance.
South African authorities disagree about the weight of the common-law
authorities on the question whether a guilty party could also forfeit assets
which he or she had brought into the marriage. For instance, Joubert
interprets the Roman-Dutch authorities as support for the view that a spouse
against whom a forfeiture order is made could retain his or her own
contributions to the joint estate - an interpretation similar to that usually
given to s 9 of the Divorce Act.22 Hahlo, in contrast, argues that '[t]he courts
could go further and order that the defendant forfeit to the plaintiff the whole
or part of his or her own estate, or his or her own contributions to the
marriage'.23 Although an exhaustive analysis of the applicable Roman-Dutch
law cannot be undertaken in this article, I would argue that the examples I
have supplied provide evidence that, if the Roman-Dutch authorities on this
issue are contradictory, there is room for questioning and perhaps reforming
the rule that forfeiture of benefits only applies to the spouse who had
contributed least to the marriage. I will refer to this again in part IV below.
(c) Pre- 1979 South African case law
The first reported South African case on the issue which I have been able to
find was the cryptic summary of the judgment of the Cape Supreme Court in
Dieperink v Dieperink to the effect that 'the defendant [was] not entided to her
share in the community, except so far as she may have contributed any
property towards the community'.24 A more comprehensive report exists for
the 1888 decision in Mulder v Mulder,25 in which Esselen and De Korte JJ
reviewed the old authorities and held that 'the Court has the right to declare
that all property brought into the marriage by the guilty party shall be
forfeited in favour of the innocent spouse'. Although JorissenJ dissented, the
majority decision was followed in the same jurisdiction in Du Toit26 in which
a husband was ordered to forfeit his part of the joint estate without
qualification as to the source of the assets.
22 Joubert op cit note 4 at 219n9, relying on Van Leeuwen R-/R 3.3.20, 4.24. 10
and 4.37.8; Voet 24.2.9; Schorer ad Gr 1.4.20; Kersteman Woordenboek s v 'dissolusie'
and 'overspel'; Van der Keesel Th 88; Van der LindenJud Pract 2.6.7, Holl Cons 6 at
321. Lee op cit note 3 at 87-8 and Erasmus et al op cit note 4 para 131 seem to agree
withJoubert, citing in addition Arntzenius Institutiones juris Belgici de conditione hotni-
num 3.7.15, 18-19 and 28.
23 Hahlo op cit note 4 at 14 note 79, relying on Van Leeuwen Cens For 1.1.5.9;
Kersteman Woordenboek s v 'dissolutie'; Sententien van den Hoogen Raad no 8 at 28.
24 (1877) 7 Buch 92.
25 (1888) 2 SAR 238. The case also refers to Hattingh v Hattingh 1887 T UR and
Hetel v Hetel 1888 T UR, but I have not been able to locate these cases.
26 (1894) 1 OR 163.
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In Dawson v Dawson De Villiers CJ discussed the Roman and Roman-
Dutch law as follows:
'There is considerable obscurity as to the Roman law and the Dutch law on the
subject. In Justinian's time, and before he legislated on the subject, it may be
broadly stated that a guilty wife who was divorced forfeited the dos contributed
by her or on her behalf, and the guilty husband forfeited the donatio propter
nuptias contributed by him. Justinian provided for the case of marriages entered
into without a dos or donatio propter nuptias, and enacted in effect (Code 5. 17.
11) that in such a case the innocent husband or wife, as the case might be,
should acquire one-fourth part of the property of the guilty spouse, provided it
did not exceed one hundred pounds.. . Both Matthaeus (de Crim 48.3.14) and
Brouwer (de jure Con. 2.33.24) construe the Political edict. of 1580, art. 18, as
reservingJ ustinian's constitution intact in the law of the Netherlands.' 27
This analysis acknowledges that in Roman and Roman-Dutch law it was
possible for a spouse to forfeit assets which he or she had brought into the
marriage. Nevertheless, the ChiefJustice held:
'I am not aware of any case in which any South African Court has travelled
beyond the broad principle that a husband or wife who is entitled to a decree of
divorce on the ground of adultery is also entitled to claim a restitution of all
property which he or she may have given by way of donation to the guilty
spouse, including property contributed by the innocent spouse to the conimu-
nity.' 28
The latter part of the dictum represents a considerable narrowing down
of Justinian's rule which, according to the court, had been retained in
Roman-Dutch law, and it makes no mention of the cases of Mulder and Du
Toit. However, because the question whether a guilty spouse could forfeit his
or her own property was not central to the case, these statements were obiter
dicta.
The matter was again considered in Celliers v Celliers,29 in which the court
analysed the Roman-Dutch authorities together with the cases which were
decided differently30 and held that, despite the lack of clarity on the issue in
Roman and Roman-Dutch law, 35 the weight of authority and past practice
in South African courts dictated that a court would not order a guilty spouse
to forfeit property which he himself or she herself had brought into the
marriage. SolomonJ declared that 'even if it had been at one time part of the
law of Holland to decree a forfeiture of one-fourth of the share of the guilty
party in the community of property, it is quite clear that that law had become
obsolete'. 32 In his separate concurring judgment, Mason J dealt specifically
27 (1892) 9 SC 446 at 447-8.
28 Ibid at 448. See also Hi ins v Higgins supra note 14 at 344.
29 Supra note 14.
30 The majority decision referred to both Mulder supra note 25 and Du Toit supra
note 26 at 931-3, but held that they had interpreted the old authorities incorrectly. It
preferred the interpretation in Dawson supra note 27.
31 Celliers supra note 14 at 930.
32 Ibid at 931.
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with the Roman authorities who held that a guilty wife could forfeit both her
dos and a portion of the property which she brought into the marriage. He
nevertheless held that '[t]he dowry in Roman law was a very special thing. It
was property which the wife agreed, before marriage, to contribute for the
support of the marriage.'
33
The Roman-Dutch authorities which support forfeiture of benefits that
had been brought into the marriage by the guilty party were said to reflect
only:
'their opinion as to how the Roman law should be applied. When, however we
come to the practice of the court, we find that they acted on the doctrine
(which seems a doctrine of common sense and a doctrine of equity) that the
guilty spouse.., should not get a profit out of the marriage - that that guilty
spouse should not, by dissolving the marriage, get a benefit by a wrong act.' 3
4
Mason J's reasoning does not, however, address the authorities to the effect
that a guilty husband could forfeit the donatio propter nuptias which he had
contributed; this, therefore, directly contradicts the idea that a person could
not forfeit financial benefits which he or she had contributed to the marriage.
It also directly contradicts Voet's explicit statement that the rule allowing
forfeiture of the dos and the donatio propter nuptias was applied in
Holland, 35 and the cases to which I referred above. 36 Celliers nevertheless
represents the emergence of a judicial consensus that forfeiture can only be
ordered against the spouse whose financial contribution to the marriage was
smaller.3
7
Another significant issue in the pre-1979 South African cases was raised by
Gates v Gates.38 Although the court followed the accepted view that a guilty
party cannot be ordered to forfeit his or her own financial contributions, it
added that, in establishing the contributions made by the guilty and innocent
spouses respectively:
'it seems to me indisputable that although a wife may not, in a positive sense,
actually bring in or earn any tangible assets or money during the marriage, her
services in managing the joint household, performing household duties, and
caring for children, have a very real and substantial value, which may well, and
usually does, exceed the bare cost of her maintenance ... [I]f the wife did not
herself perform them, her husband would normally be obliged to employ
someone else to do so for a remuneration, and thus the joint savings would
presumably be to that extent diminished ... Moreover, if a wife were entitled
to receive no credit for such services, it would seem to follow that a wife who,
33 Ibid at 934.
34 Ibid at 934-5.
35 See the quote from Voet 48.5.11 cited in 11(b) above.
6 See the cases cited by Lybrechts and Kersteman and the 1515 case discussed in
11(b) above.
37 Applied in Ferguson v Ferguson 1906 ECD 218; Murison v Murison 1930 AD 157;
Anthony v Anthony 1946 CPD 871; Allen v Allen 1951 (3) SA 320 (A). Cf Ex parte de
Beer 1952 (3) SA 288 (T) and Steenberg v Steenberg 1963 (4) SA 870 (C).
38 1940 NPD 361.
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instead of devoting herself exclusively to the performance of the domestic
duties of the household, went out to work, and thus earned monetary
remuneration, would be in a better position in regard to a division of the
community... than the wife who attended exclusively to domestic duties, for
she would, I think, clearly be entitled to be credited with the amount of her
earnings in any computation of the value of her contributions to the joint
estate; whereas the wife who had devoted herself entirely to domestic duties,
and in so doing perhaps worked equally hard, would be entitled to be credited
with nothing on that account.' 3
9
In Oppenman v Oppenman40 the court referred to a dictum from Ex parte de
Beer41 to the effect that contributions to a marriage 'include not only
wind-falls such as bequests and gifts, but also acquisitions made as a result of
industry, economy or investment.'
Although these cases typically refer to contributions resulting from
'industry or thrift', except in Gates, the contributions seem to have been of a
monetary nature, rather than the domestic work and childcare which women
usually undertake. Nevertheless, the principle that non-patrimonial or
indirect contributions should be taken into account in calculating the
spouses' contributions for the purposes of forfeiture of benefits seems to have
been accepted in some of the pre-1979 cases.
III FORFEITURE OF BENEFITS IN TERMS OF SECTION 9 OF
THE DIVORCE ACT
(a) The application ofs 9
Academic authors have argued that the court's discretion to order forfeiture
of benefits in terms of s 9 of the Divorce Act differs substantially from the
common-law power to order forfeiture. Indeed, according to Hahlo, '[t]he
forfeiture rule of s 9(1) has little in common with the pre-Divorce Act
forfeiture rule, except the word "forfeiture" '.42 The main reasons for this
distinction between forfeiture in terms of the common-law and forfeiture in
terms of the Divorce Act seem to be, first, that divorce in terms of the
Divorce Act is no longer fault-based and, consequently, that factors other
than adultery or misconduct may lead to a forfeiture order in terms of s 9.
Furthermore, courts have a wider discretion to order or withhold forfeiture
and can order full or partial forfeiture in terms of s 9, which appears not to
have been possible in terms of the common law. 43
Despite the increased ambit of courts' discretion when ordering forfeiture
based on the Divorce Act, the courts have not been willing to question the
pre-Divorce Act understanding that a party cannot be ordered to forfeit
39 Ibid at 365-6.
40 1962 (1) SA456 (SWA) at 457D-F.
41 Supra note 37 at 289. See also Ferguson v Ferguson supra note 37 at 224, 226, 227;
Smith v Smith 1937 WLD 12 at 128; Anthony vAnthony supra note 37 at 877.
42 Hahlo op cit note 4 at 373. See also Erasmus et al op cit note 4 at 131.
43 Joubert op cit note 4 at 220-1.
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benefits which he himself or she herself had contributed. Instead, the
pre-1979 position on this issue was explicitly confirmed after the adoption of
the Divorce Act.
44
The s 9 requirement that a court should order forfeiture if one spouse
would be 'unduly benefitted' in the absence of such an order, characterises
forfeiture as a mechanism to achieve fairness and justice in property
distribution at divorce. On further analysis, there appears to be three
competing, and sometimes contradictory, principles underlying the imple-
mentation of this mechanism. On the one hand, the common-law principle
of imposing financial penalties for moral and sexual misconduct remains one
of the strongest foundations for ordering forfeiture. However, as in the
pre-1979 South African cases, the principle of punishment is trumped by the
principle of contribution, articulated in the rule that a guilty spouse cannot
forfeit what he or she had brought into the marriage - the subject of this
article. The application of the principle of contribution means that only the
spouse who had made the smaller financial contribution will be penalised for
morally and sexually reprehensible conduct.
In several cases, the rationale of preventing undue benefit by way of
forfeiture has been extended to argue that a spouse would be unduly
benefitted merely by obtaining a share of financial benefits which he or she
did not contribute - in other words, that the principle of contribution is the
only, or the most significant, indication of fairness in property distribution. In
Engelbrecht,45 for instance, where the spouses had been married in community
of profit, the husband argued that his current wife should forfeit half of the
matrimonial home because he had bought the house with the proceeds of a
policy on the life of his former wife. Although there was no misconduct on
the part of the wife, the argument seemed to be that a right to share in assets
which she did not contribute in itself constituted an undue benefit which
should be forfeited. 46 These arguments have repeatedly been rejected by the
Supreme Court ofAppeal. 47 As the court explained in Engelbrecht:
'Joint ownership of the other spouse's assets is acquired when parties marry. In
the absence of an order of forfeiture of benefits, the spouse who had
contributed less will always benefit at the dissolution of marriage, unless both
spouses' contributions to the joint estate (either before or during marriage) had
been of exactly equal value. This is an inevitable consequence of their
matrimonial property regime.' 48
4' Rousalis v Rousalis 1980 (3) SA 446 (C) at 450E; Khoza v Khoza 1982 (3) SA 462
(T) at 464-5; Singh v Singh 1983 (1) SA 781 (C) at 790B-D; Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht
1989 (1) SA 597 (C);JWv SW2011 (1) SA 545 (GNP) paras 20-23.
41 Supra note 44.
46 For similarly based claims, see Watt v Watt 1984 (2) SA 455 (W); Matyila v
Matyila 1987 (3) SA 230 (W); Binda v Binda 1993 (2) SA 123 (W); Botha v Botha 2006
(4) SA 144 (SCA).
47 Wijker v Wjker 1993 (4) SA 720 (A) at 731F; Botha v Botha supra note 46.
48 Engelbrecht supra note 44 at 601F-G, my translation of the original Afrikaans:
'Mede-eienaarskap van die ander gade se goed is 'n reg wat elk van die egliede by die
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In rejecting the abovementioned application of the principle of contribution,
the courts resorted to a third, dominant principle of South African matrimo-
nial property law - the contractual principle of pacta sunt servanda, which
dictates that spouses are entitled to the financial benefits as stipulated by their
chosen matrimonial property regime.
My analysis illustrates the relationship between the policies and values
which underlie what our law considers to be fair property allocation at
divorce. Foundational to our system is the idea that parties should make
choices about the financial consequences of their marriage before they enter
into marriage, and that these choices should be enforced at divorce. This is
qualified by the ancient principle that moral or sexual guilt should be met
with financial punishment which, in turn, is limited by the logic of
contribution, protecting the party who had made the larger financial
contribution from the adverse consequences of his or her misconduct.
Contribution, however, does not trump the fundamental value of pacta sunt
servanda, since it does not provide a guilty spouse in a marriage in
community of property with a right to more than half of thejoint estate, even
if the guilty spouse had in fact contributed all of the assets. I will return to the
problems associated with the principle of contribution and the need for a
general redistributive mechanism for marital property in the parts of the
article that follow.
(b) Contributions
A consequence of the particular application of forfeiture of benefits in
post-1979 cases is that a court has to evaluate the spouses' respective
contributions in order, first, to ascertain whether one of them would be
unduly benefitted by a property distribution according to their matrimonial
property regime, and secondly, in order to determine whether the party
against whom a forfeiture order is granted, is protected against such an order
by having made the larger contribution. Most frequently, spouses' respective
contributions have been defined in purely financial terms. The only
post-1979 case which cursorily refers to the extended definition of spouses'
contributions, as articulated in Gates,4 9 is Singh. However, in this case, the
contributions of the wife were clearly disparaged and entitled her to only
twenty per cent of thejoint estate:
'[T]he defendant has done very little to establish her contribution save to show
that she looked after the children when they needed looking after, kept house,
huwehksluiting verwerf. Tensy die partye (hetsy voor oftydens die huwelik) presies
gelyke bydraes tot die boedel gemaak het, sal die een wat minder bygedra het by
ontbinding van die huwelik bo die ander bevoordeel word as verbeuring nie beveel
word nie. Dit is 'n onafvendbare gevolg van die partye se huweliksgoedereregbedel-
ing.'
" Supra note 38.
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helped to build it in the first place (to a very small extent), and contributed some
uncertain sums of money at various times towards food.'50
(c) Moral guilt
It is worth analysing the actual ways in which courts apply the factors which,
according to s 9, could lead to an order for forfeiture of benefits. They are
'the duration of the marriage, the circumstances which gave rise to the
break-down thereof, and any substantial misconduct on the part of either of
the parties. .. '."
Reflecting the shift from guilt to irretrievable breakdown in our divorce
law,52 these factors represent a considerably wider discretion for judges than
the adultery or malicious desertion to which the common-law rule of
forfeiture was limited. Nevertheless, a review of the cases illustrates that
moral guilt remains the most important consideration when judges exercise
their discretion to order forfeiture. It is particularly in judges' understanding
and articulation of these moral norms and standards that we discern most
clearly the gendered expectations and double standards of appropriate
behaviour by wives and husbands.
Take, for instance, the attitudes towards domestic violence which, in the
recent case ofJWv SWwas regarded as substantial misconduct because:
'[d]omestic violence, in particular against women, strikes at the foundation and
premise of a non-sexist and democratic order. It is a repulsive phenomenon
which has no place in a society founded on the values of freedom, dignity,
honour and security.'5 3
Leaving aside the court's ultimate refusal to order forfeiture of benefits in this
case, it is helpful to compare earlier courts' treatment of domestic violence. In
Singh the wife's adultery and desertion of the home was regarded as serious
misconduct for the purposes of forfeiture of benefits, but her allegations that
she had left her home to escape her husband's regular assaults and threats to
kill her were dismissed as merely a part of 'the cat-and-dog life of the
parties'. 5 4 In Wjker5 5 the wife's refusal to give her husband shares in her
business was adjudged just as reprehensible as the assaults by her husband,
while in Soupionas the evidence of repeated assaults by the husband was
accepted, but the court held that:
'[t]he importance of these assaults are mitigated by the fact that the marriage was
50 Singh supra note 44 at 790D-F.
s' Section 9(1) of the Divorce Act.
52 Erasmus et al op cit note 4 para 131 opine that '[i]n terms of the new divorce law
the relative guilt or innocence of the spouses in the breakdown of their marriage is in
principle irrelevant and forfeiture of benefits has thus acquired the entirely different
function of preventing a spouse from acquiring a morally indefensible financial
advantage from his failed marriage.' I think that this is an overstatement, given the
retention of'substantial misconduct' in s 9.
s3JWv SWsupra note 44 para 29.
s Supra note 44 at 785B-C.
ss Supra note 47.
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contracted after living together for a long period and the plaintiff must have
been well aware that she was marrying a man of violent temper and thus
voluntarily exposed herself to assault'.56
My point is this: sexist attitudes about domestic violence, patriarchal double
standards about sexual infidelity, and gendered norms about the behaviour of
wives and husbands which are broadly held in society also colour judges'
evaluations of spouses' behaviour which, in turn, influence the exercise of
the discretion to order forfeiture of benefits. This means that misconduct by
wives would often furnish reasons for ordering forfeiture against them, while
misconduct by husbands may be overlooked or dismissed as being less
serious. Gendered evaluations of misconduct operate in conjunction with
definitions of marital contribution which favour the economic contributions
which men typically make and with the rule that the spouse who had
contributed most cannot be subject to forfeiture of benefits. The combina-
tion of these three features of forfeiture of benefits means that it is more likely
to be used to punish wives who transgress sexual and social norms. Husbands,
by contrast, are protected against forfeiture orders, first by sexist definitions
of marital misconduct; secondly, by courts failing to take cognisance of the
kinds of non-monetary contributions which wives typically made; and,
finally, by husbands usually having made larger financial contributions during
the marriage.
IV CHALLENGES TO THE RULE THAT A SPOUSE WHO HAD
CONTRIBUTED MOST CANNOT FORFEIT
Having sketched the history of forfeiture of benefits and its current
application by the courts, the this part of the article aims to argue that the rule
which protects a spouse who had made the larger financial contribution to a
marriage against a forfeiture order is not as inevitable as it first appears. I
contend that there is space for a different interpretation, and present some
legal and policy considerations to justify my argument.
(a) Historical basis
In the part II(a) above I have shown how, in Roman law, a guilty wife could
forfeit her dos and a guilty husband his donatio propter nuptias at divorce. In
both cases this would constitute forfeiture of financial benefits brought into
the marriage by the spouses. The argument that the dos was somehow not
brought into the marriage by the wife, but constituted a donation before the
marriage5 7 seems questionable and, in any event, does not explain forfeiture
of the donatio propter nuptias by the husband.
Roman-Dutch law may indeed contain contradictory authority on the
issue, but there is evidence that courts ordered the guilty spouse to forfeit
assets which he or she had brought into the marriage. In addition, some early
56 Soupionas v Soupionas 1983 (3) SA 757 (T) at 758-9.
17 See the discussion of MasonJ's judgment in Celliers supra note 14 at 934 in part
IlI(c) above.
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South African cases held that a spouse could forfeit assets which he or she had
contributed to the marriage. 58 These cases reflect the religious condemnation
of adultery and the punitive measures contained in the Political Ordinance of
1580. The old authorities and early cases are therefore not unanimous on the
issue, but instead provide alternatives to the rule that was later adopted by the
South African courts.
Moreover, and despite my great enjoyment of consulting the old authori-
ties in this area, I cannot resist questioning the weight which should be
attached to Roman and Roman-Dutch authority in contemporary South
African family law. Amongst the Roman-Dutch rules in this area which
amuse and astonish us are, for instance, that a divorced person may not
subsequently marry the person with whom he or she had previously
committed adultery, 59 that the adulterous party may only re-marry after the
innocent party had remarried, 60 and the imposition of heavier criminal
penalties on a wife who had connitted adultery with a Jewish man. 61 We
recognise that our changed views and circumstances oblige us to relinquish
certain rules of ancient family law, even though they are clearly part of our
legal heritage. More than two centuries of social and political change and a
large continent separate us from the cultural and philosophical contexts in
which our common law is rooted. What the Romans and the Dutch thought
and practised in Europe in the distant past can surely not be decisive, and may
even be wholly irrelevant, in contemporary South Africa, particularly given
the constitutional prohibition of gender-based discrimination, to which I
return below.
(b) What are the patrimonial benefits of marriage in community ofproperty?
Underlying the interpretation of the forfeiture rule in marriages in commu-
nity of property is a definition of those benefits subject to forfeiture as being
the spouse's opportunity to share in financial benefits which he himself or she
herself did not generate. 62 This definition thus excludes those financial
benefits which he or she did generate from being subject to forfeiture.
There is, however, another plausible possibility. One could instead argue
that the patrimonial benefit of a marriage in community of property is the
right to one half of the joint estate upon dissolution, irrespective of the
proportion contributed by each spouse before or during the marriage.
Supporting such an argument is the fact that a husband who had contributed
all the assets in the joint estate only has the right to half of the joint estate at
dissolution. It is this right to half of the joint estate which can be totally or
partially forfeited by either spouse, irrespective of their contributions to the
growth of the joint estate. Such a view would allow either spouse to forfeit
" Mulder v Muldersupra note 25; Du Toit v Du Toit supra note 26.
5' Kersteman Woordenboek s v 'dissolutie' at 107.
60 Ibid.
61 Kersteman Woordenboek s v 'dissolutie' at 105.
62 See, for instance, the quote from Sonnekus op cit note 2 cited in part I above.
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financial benefits, irrespective of the proportion of the joint estate which they
had contributed and would, in effect, also allow a spouse to forfeit assets
which he or she had generated.
I would argue that this interpretation is viable because it resonates with the
legal treatment of the joint estate during the subsistence of a marriage in
community of property. The joint estate includes all the separate assets and
liabilities which the parties brought into marriage, except for those which
were specifically excluded by the parties or by operation of law. Both spouses
are joint co-owners of this estate, described by Erasmus et al as 'tied
up/bound co-ownership' because of the limits on each spouse's capacity to
dispose of the jointly owned assets. 63 Although divorcing spouses may have a
right of recourse in respect of certain impermissible transactions during the
marriage,6 4 their rights to recourse are only effective if, at the dissolution of
the marriage, the joint estate contains sufficient funds to recompense them.
Moreover, these are rights to compensation, not to particular assets. In the
case of insolvency of a spouse who is married in community of property, the
joint estate is sequestrated, irrespective of which spouse had contributed
what to the joint estate and even 'separate' assets of the spouses are liable to
sequestration.6 5 All of these rules point to the fact that, during the subsistence
of a marriage in community of property, there is a single joint estate and that
the law does not favour a rigid bookkeeping of who contributed what during
and before the marriage.
To regard the benefits of a marriage in community of property as the right
to share in half of the joint estate at the dissolution of the marriage seems to
me a logical consequence of the legal treatment of the joint estate during the
marriage. The opposite view and the one which underlies the interpretation
of forfeiture of benefits which I take issue with, namely that the benefits of a
marriage in community of property consist of the right to share in assets
which a spouse had not generated, appears contrived by comparison.
(c) Public policy in succession
A different argument arises when one compares marriages which end as a
result of divorce with marriages which are ended by the death of a spouse.
According to Sonnekus, the latter event is twice as likely to end the marriage
as the former.66
The common-law rule relating to forfeiture of benefits embodies the
public policy that no one should receive financial benefits from their own
wrongdoing. 67 In the law of succession, this broad principle also underlies
63 Erasmus et al op cit note 4 para 80.
64 Section 15(9) (b) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984.
61 Sonnekus op cit note 2 at 789-90 and the authorities cited there.
66 Ibid at 788.
67 Cronj6 & Heaton op cit note 13 at 131n33.
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the rule 'de bloedige hand neemt geen erfenis', 68 which prevents people who
have murdered their spouses from benefitting by intestate or testate succes-
sion from the deceased spouse. In marriages in community of property,
however, Ex Parte Vonzel169 and Nell v NelP0 held that the surviving spouse
remains entitled to a half share of the property where the marriage was in
community of property, but forfeits any inheritances or legacies. This rule
was not applied only to the spouse who had contributed less to the joint
estate, and thus conflicts with the application of the forfeiture rule at divorce.
There is, however, contrary authority. In Leeb v Leeb Tl the court held that a
wife who had murdered her husband in a marriage in community ofproperty
could, on the basis of public policy, be required to forfeit her entitlement to
that part of the joint estate which she did not contribute, akin to the
application of the forfeiture rule at divorce. The matter has not yet been
decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal, resulting in a potential anomaly
between the position of a person who ends a marriage in community of
property by killing his or her spouse, and a person who ends the marriage
through misconduct leading to divorce. If the Vonzell and Nell cases were
followed, the murderous spouse would be entitled to half the joint estate,
irrespective of his or her contribution to the joint estate, while at divorce, he
or she could forfeit a part or the whole of the joint estate if he or she had
contributed less than the other spouse. 72
(d) Contributions
The current focus on financial contributions at the expense of domestic work
and childcare typically contributed by women is understandable in the light
of the fact that non-financial contributions are not easily quantified in
monetary terms, nor can they, once made, easily be returned in kind by
husbands.
An argument which would not negate, but merely temper, the rule that a
spouse cannot forfeit that which he or she has contributed, flows from the
cases in which non-monetary contributions have been taken into account in
calculating the spouses' respective contributions .7 3 If such contributions were
unfailingly to be taken into account, the childrearing and housekeeping
work which wives usually undertake and their contributions towards their
husbands' careers would offset at least some of the financial contributions
68 Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley 'Forfeiture by a beneficiary who conspires to
assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm: Danielz NO v De Wet 2009 (6) SA 42
(C)' (2010) 127 SALJ30 at 30.
69 1953 (1) SA 122 (C).
70 1976 (3) SA 700 (T). See also Casey NO v The Master 1992 (4) SA 505 (N), in
which the same ruling was made in relation to a man who had negligently caused the
death of his wife.
71 [1999] 2All SA588 (N).
72 This point was made in Leeb ibid at 595-6.
73 See the discussion of Cates supra note 38; Oppenman supra note 40; Ex Parte De
Beersupra note 37; and Singh supra note 44 in parts 111(b) and III(c) above.
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which husbands make. Extending the recognition of women's typical
contributions from redistribution to forfeiture orders would diminish
(although not entirely erase) the gendered impact of the current rule.7 4
In addition to the authority provided by the cases cited in part 11 (b) above,
there are two other considerations in favour of this argument. The first is that
non-patrimonial contributions are considered when redistribution orders in
terms of s 7(3) of the Divorce Act are made. This results from the explicit
wording of s 7(4), which requires a court to be:
'satisfied that it is equitable and just by reason of the fact that the party in whose
favour the order is granted, contributed directly or indirectly to the mainte-
nance or increase of the estate of the other party during the subsistence of the
marriage, either by the rendering of services, or the saving of expenses which
would otherwise have been incurred, or in any other manner'.
Although s 9 contains no reference to such contributions, and despite the
judgments which hold that the factors in s 9 constitute a numerus clausus
beyond which courts may not look in ordering forfeiture of benefits, 75 the
respective contributions of the spouses are in any event taken into account in
applying the rule that forfeiture will not be ordered against the spouse who
had made the larger contribution. If courts already take contributions into
account in relation to forfeiture of benefits, it makes sense that the wider
notion of contribution, as applied to redistribution orders, should also apply
in respect of forfeiture orders. Both redistribution and forfeiture are methods
of ameliorating the unfairly strict application of the chosen matrimonial
property regime at divorce and consistent definition of key concepts such as
the spouses' contributions to the marriage seems both necessary and logical.
By way of contrast, a narrow focus on financial contributions in relation to
forfeiture would be incongruous and would constitute indirect gender
discrimination because it undervalues the kinds of work which women
typically perform within families in favour of the accumulation of financial
assets, which is typically required of husbands.76
Finally, in calculating third-party liability for causing the death of a wife,
non-financial contributions have been included for some time. 77 The third
party is legally liable to the surviving spouse for the loss of support provided
by the deceased spouse, which, in turn, rests on the reciprocal common-law
duty of support between spouses. This duty includes not only the provision
of financial support, but extends to non-financial contributions of the kind
typically made by wives.78 As in the case of redistribution orders, consistency
" See the discussion in part IV(e) below.
71 Wjkersupra note 47 at 731E-H; Botha supra note 46 para 8.76 Brigitte Clark & Beth Goldblatt 'Gender and family law' in Elsje Bonthuys &
Cathi Albertyn (eds) Gender, Law and Justice (2007) 195 at 201-2. The discrimination
argument is pursued further in part IV(e) below.
77 Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657 at
669; Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 53.
78 Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke supra note 77 at
669.
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would require that, where the law not only recognises but demands
non-financial contributions from spouses as part of their reciprocal duties of
support, these kinds of contributions should not be disregarded or minimised
in the context of forfeiture of benefits.
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that courts regularly underesti-
mate the value of the work typically done by women,79 as is illustrated by the
court's disparaging statements and tone in Singh.80 Taking account of
women's work would therefore reduce, but not eradicate, the advantages
which husbands generally obtain from the courts' ordering forfeiture of
benefits only against the spouse who had made the smaller financial
contribution.
(e) Discrimination and substantive equality
The courts' interpretation of s 9 of the Divorce Act means that forfeiture as a
financial penalty for marital misconduct can only be imposed on the spouse
who had made the smaller financial contribution to a marriage - in effect
this is generally the poorer spouse. Although socio-economic status is not
one of the prohibited grounds for discrimination listed in s 9 of the
Constitution, and the onus to prove that the differentiation amounts to unfair
discrimination therefore rests upon the party alleging discrimination, it may
nevertheless be argued that the application of the forfeiture rule constitutes
direct unfair discrimination against the poorer spouse. In Harksen v Lane
NO 8 the majority of the Constitutional Court held that 'there will be
discrimination on an unspecified ground if it is based on attributes or
characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of
persons as human beings'.
Dignity is also an important aspect of a court's enquiry into the fairness of
an alleged discriminatory act or legal provision. 82 When determining
whether discrimination is unfair, a court should take account of:
'(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered
in the past from patterns of disadvantage, whether the discrimination... is
on a specified ground or not;
(b) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be
achieved by it.' 83
It would, no doubt, be argued that the rule protecting the wealthier spouse
against forfeiture of benefits simply has the objective of achieving fairness
between the spouses by protecting the financial benefits contributed by a
particular spouse from being unduly awarded to the other spouse. However,
nowhere else in family law is there a rule which similarly protects a spouse
7' Elsje Bonthuys 'Labours of love: Child custody and the division of matrimonial
property at divorce' (2001) 64 THRHR 192 at 204.
80 See the quote from Singh supra note 44 discussed in part 111(b) above.
81 1998 (1) SA300 (CC) para 47.
82 lbid para 52.
13 Ibid para 53.
458 (2014) 131 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL
merely on the basis that he had made a larger financial contribution. Neither
in delictual claims between spouses, nor in respect of the right of recourse at
the dissolution of marriage is it a defence that a spouse had made a larger
contribution. Nor can it be said that this limitation of the poorer spouse's
rights to forfeiture 'is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom' in terms of s 36 of the
Constitution.
The argument for indirect discrimination on the basis of gender is
probably even stronger. It is trite that, compared to men, women in South
Africa have been educationally and economically disadvantaged. Their
economic disadvantage is exacerbated on marriage when social expectations
that they should bear primary responsibility for childcare and homemaking
impact negatively on their ability to work and amass assets.8 4 Although the
rule that the wealthier spouse cannot be ordered to forfeit in terms of s 9 of
the Divorce Act appears to be gender neutral, the fact that it will most often
preclude wives from claiming forfeiture means that it discriminates indirectly
on the basis of gender.
When considering the history and purpose of the rule, it becomes clear
that, at least at common-law, it echoed and confirmed gendered double
standards of sexual conduct which punish women, especially wives, more
severely for extra-marital sex. A similar legal embodiment of sexual double
standards is the common-law rule relating to the paternity of extra-marital
children which had the objective of punishing such mothers and children by
depriving them of rights against fathers.", Although adultery is no longer the
only ground for forfeiture orders, marital misconduct remains one of the
grounds for such orders. Moreover, I have shown that gendered double
standards persist when courts tend to regard the kinds of misconduct in
which men most frequently engage, like domestic violence, more lenient-
ly.86
Bhana observes of the common-law rules of contract that '[t]he classical
(private) common law structures, ... although seemingly "value neutral"
when considered in the abstract, implicidy endorsed the carefully engineered
patterns of wealth and power in the apartheid society in which they
applied'.8 7 This is equally true of the common-law rules of family law,
particularly the application of forfeiture of benefits only to the spouse who
made the smaller financial contribution. I would therefore suggest that the
time has come to reconsider this rule on the ground that it discriminates
unfairly on the grounds of gender and socio-economic status.
84 Clark & Goldblatt op cit note 76 at 205; Heaton op cit note 1 at 550-1.
5 Clark & Goldblatt op cit note 76 at 227.
86 See part Ill(c) above.
87 Deeksha Bhana 'The horizontal application of the Bill of Rights: A reconcilia-
tion of sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution' (2013) 29 SAJHR 351 at 353.
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V CONCLUSION: FIXED MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
REGIMES OR WIDER JUDICIAL DISCRETIONS?
In her 2005 article, Heaton recommends that the existing judicial discretion
to deviate from the chosen matrimonial property regime at dissolution of
civil marriages should be replaced by a wider discretion, applicable to all
marriages and aiming at substantive gender equality in the distribution of
marital assets. 88 She also advocates a statutory definition of marital property,
which includes non-financial contributions and contributions to the other
spouses' career prospects. 8 9
I agree with both of her recommendations. The Divorce Act has been in
place for more than 30 years and, as a result of the adoption of the
Constitution, legal culture in South African has undergone a fundamental
shift, while social practices around marriage and divorce have changed
drastically. It can no longer be assumed that dividing property in accordance
with the matrimonial property regime chosen at marriage would invariably
lead to fair and just results between the spouses at dissolution, and a simplistic
reliance on pacta sunt servanda cannot satisfy the constitutional requirement
of substantive gender equality in family law. Moreover, the introduction of a
general discretion to order a just property redistribution in customary
marriages out of community of property by the Gumedejudgment 90 raises the
question whether the lack such a discretion in civil marriages amounts to
discrimination against spouses in civil marriages.
A general redistributive power at the end of marriage can, I believe,
co-exist with a choice of matrimonial property regimes by the spouses. For
the duration of the marriage, spouses and creditors benefit from the legal
certainty associated with the chosen property regime. However, holding
spouses to their antenuptial contract or, as in South Africa, giving courts a
very narrow discretion to deviate from the stipulated property consequences,
is not optimal, nor does it lead to fairness at the dissolution of marriage.
Marriage can be a very long-term relationship during which the circum-
stances of the contracting parties change drastically. In other long-term
contractual relationships, parties will usually include detailed provisions for
contingencies in their contract, including mechanisms for dispute resolution.
In antenuptial contracts, prospective spouses do not make similarly detailed
arrangements, assuming either that their marriages will last harmoniously
until death or that courts will make a fair division of assets in the event of
divorce. In the case of marriages in community of property, the matrimonial
property regime is often not even negotiated between the prospective
spouses beforehand. These factors justify the creation of a statutory discretion
for courts to deviate from the agreed upon property consequences at
dissolution to a greater extent than has been hitherto allowed.
88 Op cit note 1 at 562.
89 Ibid at 573.
90 Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC).
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Nevertheless, we should also remember that the creation of a more general
statutory judicial discretion may not suffice because judges can always
exercise discretions in sexist ways. The common-law rule preventing the
poorer spouse from claiming forfeiture of benefits is one example of such a
(possibly unconscious) sexist interpretation. Another can be found in the
ways in which misconduct by men tends to be regarded with less censure
than that of women. Where a judicial discretion is granted, therefore, it
should be sufficiently clearly circumscribed and described to force judges to
value women's typical contributions to marriage as highly as they do the
(financial) contributions of men.
